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Introduction 
Within the broad scope of the literature on peasant rebellion and resistance, this pa-
per examines campesino reactions to Sandinista agrarian policy and attempts to ex-
plain the political organisation and support of the Contra rebels in the highlands of 
Nicaragua. The current discussion belongs to a revisionist literature generated in the 
wake of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process. This includes a number of texts 
which have critically re-examined the ways in which the Frente Sandinista de Lib-
eration Nacional (FSLN) attempted to transform the social and political reality of 
Nicaragua, above all with regard to the peasantry1 and ethnic communities.2 
The organisation of the paper is as follows: section one considers Sandinista 
agrarian policy and policy-making processes from a macro-analytical perspective. 
The transformation of land ownership, investment credit and revolutionary commer-
cialisation policies are analysed and the earlier debate on agricultural reality as it de-
veloped within the Sandinista Party throughout 1979-80 is discussed. 
The second section considers the impact of this early policy on the central 
highland agricultural frontier. Nicaraguan agrarian reality was not homogenous: 
although the macro-region of the Pacific was perhaps characterised by agro-
export latifundia, landlords and proletarians, the agricultural frontier in the 
highlands was of a completely different nature. This agricultural frontier is re-
ferred to here as the pais campesino, the Peasant Country. Its social structure and 
economic logic are considered here and located within a brief review of the rele-
vant anthropological literature on the subject of the peasantry. 
The third section focuses on the double aggression carried out in the Peasant 
Country by Contra troops and the Sandinista army and analyses how certain 
concrete factors incited this rural community to react by developing the Peasant-
Contra. In addition, section three reflects on the different and contradictory so-
cioeconomic interests that existed between the peasants enrolled in the Contra 
and the Contra elite, who financed, politicised and took advantage of the war. 
The conclusion outlines a critical approach to analysing the impact of high-tech 
agrarian policies in traditional rural societies and the reactions of these communities 
to such policy initiatives. In this sense, the paper makes an original contribution to 
1 Castro (1990); Baumeister (1998); Bendana (1991); Biondi-Morra (1990); Enriquez (1991, 1992); 
Horton (1998); C1AV-OEA (1999). 
2 Bataillon (1999); Hale (1994); Rizo (1999); Vilas (1991). The range of revisionist assessments of 
the Sandinista period in office is broad. First, there are the discussions generated by those party tech-
nocrats and politicians who were involved in developing the FSLN's agrarian policies, who, with the 
benefit of hindsight, have carried out a critical assessment of actions previously undertaken. Among 
these works the following are of particular importance: Orlando Nunez et al (1991); Eduardo Bau-
meister (1991; 1998); Peter Marchetti (1989); Luis Serra (1990, 1993), Carlos Maria Vilas (1991); as 
well as the considerable production of documents — many of them anonymous — examining rural 
development projects reproduced by the veritable galaxy of NGOs working in Nicaragua, which 
have been reproduced by many of the ex-technicians from MID1NRA who, in the 1990s, found em-
ployment in international cooperation. Second, certain academic research has also advanced a revi-
sionist interpretation. The following works are of special importance: that of Lynn Horton (1998) 
concerning the impact of the Contra War on the comarcas of Quilali; the analysis by Francis Hou-
tard and Genovieve Lemercier (1992) of the cooperativisation of the peasant communities of 
Comejen; the studies undertaken by Laura Enriquez (1992) into the Pacific cooperatives; the detailed 
analysis carried out by Jeffrey Gould (1990) into the emergence of a working-class consciousness in 
Chinandega; and that of Frank Keller (1986) in Wiwili — as well as the multiple research projects 
undertaken as degree theses by social science graduates from the UNAN and UCA. 
existing debates on Sandinista agrarian policy, on the failures of political organi-
sation and on the symbolic dimensions of the Nicaraguan Revolution. 
An interpretation of events in the Nicaraguan rural highlands throughout the 
1980s requires, first, a knowledge of the material conditions in which the society in 
question developed and, second, an understanding of the ideological processes that 
were at play, affecting both the various levels of society and its many individual 
'actors'. In traditional agricultural societies (such as that of the Nicaraguan frontera 
agricola — the object of this research), the peasants' home territory represents the 
basic unit of production, of consumption and of reproduction and therefore provides 
the basis for their economic, social and political power. In this way, the strength of 
the bond between 'home' and 'land' — generally considered 'family patrimony' — 
and the way that this bond is experienced both by landowners and tenants, consti-
tutes a very particular system of regulation and provides a wide margin of autonomy 
for peasants — both regionally and locally. The distribution and redistribution of re-
sources are connected to the dynamics of family and social relationships.3 This cre-
ates a society based on its own system of principles, of peasant family unity, which 
in turn determines the behaviour and attitudes of the individuals of which it is com-
posed. At the same time these are individuals who generally owe their origin and de-
velopment to the phenomena of 'marginal work' and 'self-exploitation', as 
Chayanov indicates (1927, 1966), and who have built a particular world view re-
ferred to by E.P. Thompson (1979) and James Scott (1976) as the 'moral economy' 
of the poor or the peasant. 
In order to understand how ideological processes affect the individual and col-
lective view of prevailing social conditions, the approach set out by E.P. Thompson 
(1979) is particularly useful. Thompson asserts that 'people find themselves in a so-
ciety structured in a specific way (crucially, but not exclusively, in terms of produc-
tion relations), experience diverse forms of exploitation, identify conflicting points of 
interest, begin to fight for these questions and, in the process of fighting, discover 
themselves through collective self-conscience as social participators'. Precisely for 
this reason, there is no given model which can provide us with the 'true' formation 
and preparation of individuals, classes or consciousness. In contrast to the literature 
which attempted to answer the question framed by Skocpol (1982), namely: 'What 
makes peasants revolutionary?'4 — my current interest lies in answering the inverse 
equation: Why did the peasants from the rural areas in Nicaragua's interior form the 
social base of the counterrevolution? 
The Sandinista insurrection of 1978-79 — which attracted attention as a result of 
the breadth and intensity of popular participation in the uprising — mobilised very 
specific groups of social subjects. Students represented the main force (30 per cent), 
followed by the so-called gentes de oficio, a category which included craftsmen, 
manual workers (for example from garages and workshops) and the self-employed 
3 Scott (1985). 
4 Most of the theoretical literature relating to the peasantry and its political expressions produced in 
the last two decades considered the rebellious character of this sector and its participation in the vari-
ous revolutionary events that occurred in the twentieth century; see Barrington Moore (1966); Eric 
Wolf (1969); Joel Migdal (1974); Jeffrey Paige (1975); Gerrit Huizier (1973); James Scott (1976); 
Henry Landsberger (1978); Theda Skocpol (1982); and Timothy Wickham-Crowley (1991). Less 
attention has been paid to the question of why peasants in Latin America may resist leftist guerrillas 
or revolutionary governments and support counterrevolutionary movements; for consideration of the 
Guatemalan case, see Stoll (1993); for Nicaragua, see Hale (1994). 
(22 per cent) and other workers.5 The common connection of the remainder of those 
involved was their preoccupation and uncertainty with regard to the future. Finally, 
there was also a small number of farm workers and farmers themselves, a fact that 
clearly indicates the principally urban nature of the uprising. The insurrection repre-
sented the upsurge of anger felt by an urban 'collective' born during the process of 
accelerated modernisation that took place in the years of 'unequal growth'.6 It was a 
group fighting against both the precariousness of a future that offered few, if any, 
hopeful perspectives and against a regime that, through its despotism, had provoked 
a generalised rejection of arbitrary police violence, corruption and political exclu-
sion. The FSLN mobilised and encouraged this heterogenous group which, following 
the murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, had lost all confidence in the possibility of 
reforming the political system. It is not only the case that the pre-revolutionary re-
gime fell because of the 'dictator's primitive character' or because of the 'errors of 
the imperialist enemy',7 but also because of the ability of popular forces to develop 
the strategies and means to articulate their struggle.8 
The Frente Sandinista gave people the means with which to put forward their 
demands more effectively. And these very people, once they had taken to the streets, 
gave power to the FSLN. But they also provided the social and human base of the 
revolution, a political discourse, a set of demands and — above all — a 'face' for the 
revolution. Eminently urban, this gave substance to the Sandinista revolution, which 
in turn incorporated the people into its institutions and drew up public policies that 
would benefit this urban mass. However, the Achilles' heel of the revolution was the 
peasant collectives in the interior regions which, while certainly sharing in the pov-
erty and hopelessness felt by their urban compatriots before the revolution, differed 
enormously in their attitudes and demands. 
The aim of this analysis is, therefore, to focus on how and why the social, politi-
cal and economic transformation that the Sandinista revolution represented had such 
a negative effect on the peasant farmer groups from the rural interior zones, so far 
removed from the insurrection movement, and to examine how this prompted a col-
lective response which brought the fanners directly into conflict with the FSLN 
For this reason, it is important to distinguish the reasons why peasants from the 
Central Highlands rebelled, the factors that influence the manner in which peasant dis-
content is expressed and to comprehend the often unintended outcomes of peasant re-
bellion. Scott (1985, 1990) argues that, as a subordinate class, peasants are generally 
unable to express complaints openly because of the 'dull compulsion of economic re-
lations' and the 'realities of power', and instead opt to carry out everyday resistance, 
which may take such forms as pilfering, lying, gossip and work slowdowns. Along 
similar lines, Colburn (1986, 1989) argues that Nicaraguan peasants, who were 'nearly 
defenceless' under the revolutionary government and essentially rational actors con-
cerned not with abstract ideology but rather with their individual wellbeing, expressed 
their discontent with Sandinista policies by employing the 'weapons of the weak' de-
scribed above. Additionally, Hoiton's work on Quilali suggests that poor anti-
Sandinista peasants in particular recognised their own vulnerability, and many pre-
ferred everyday resistance as their fust line of response.9 As will be seen, anti-
5 Vilas (1984), p. 151. 
6 Dunkerley (1988 ), pp. 169-220. 
7 Wickham-Crowley (1991). 
8 Vilas (1984). 
9 See Horton (1998), pp. 202-27. 
Sandinista women and older men were partly successful in maintaining an outward ap-
pearance of neutrality, often while secretly collaborating with the Contras. However, 
the dynamics of militarisation in the war zones made it extremely difficult for young 
men to avoid taking up arms either with the EPS or the Contras.10 
The research presented here is based on various publications produced through-
out the second half of the 1980s; on reports and internal documents drawn up by in-
stitutions connected both to the agricultural reforms (CIERA, MIDINRA, UNAG) 
and to the Sandinista administration (MINT, DGSE); on discussions and interviews 
with former Sandinista activists who worked in Agricultural Reform, in the EPS and 
the DGSE and with former members of the Nicaraguan Resistance, and finally, on 
fieldwork specifically carried out in certain interior rural zones — particularly in the 
municipalities of Condega and Matiguas — during my stay with the Instituto de 
Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamerica in 1996.11 
The Sandinista Agricultural Reform or the challenge of modernisation 
The transformation of land ownership 
The Sandinistas' commitment to a radical transformation of social relationships 
in the countryside, to the benefit of the peasants, had already been made explicit 
in the 1969 Programa Historico del FSLN. This document called for the imme-
diate and full-scale handover of land to the peasantry; the elimination of all large 
estates; a development plan that would both diversify and intensify agricultural 
production; compensation for the burguesia patriotica affected by such agricul-
tural reform; and the creation of schemes to generate work for the peasantry, 
thereby eliminating temporary unemployment.12 
Many of the points set out in the above mentioned document were fully de-
veloped in the design for agricultural reform that was carried out from 1979 on-
wards. It is important to note the speed with which land redistribution and 
resource allocation took place.13 The initial tendency was very clear: to give pri-
ority to the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo (APP — expropriated land in the 
hands of the state) and to formulate food policy on the basis of this prioritisation. 
This is indicated by a 1980 Ministerio de Planificacion (MIPLAN) report which 
stated: 'the strategy is not simply to increase the productive capacity of nation-
alised companies in the short to medium term; it is also to convert such compa-
nies into the strategic sector of the New Economy'.14 
The revolutionary government placed great emphasis on agricultural reform. For 
example, the 1982 document drawn up by the Ministry of Agricultural and Farming 
Development and Agricultural Reform (MIDINRA) entitled Estrategia de Desarrollo 
10 War zones which included the departments of Nueva Segovia, Jinotega, Matagalpa, Boaco and Chontales. 
11 Most of the classic literature relating to the peasantry and its political expressions examined the 
rebellious character of this sector and its participation in revolutionary events. As noted in footnote 4, 
the excellent works by Barrington Moore (1966), Eric Wolf (1969), Joel Migdal (1974), Jeffery 
Paige (1975), Gerrit Huizer (1973), James Scott (1976), Henry Landsberger (1978), Theda Skocpol 
(1982) and Timothy Wickham-Crowley (1991) are particularly noteworthy 
12 FSLN (1969), pp. 9-10. 
13 Utting (1988), p. 3. 
14 MIPLAN (1980), p. 45. 
Agropecuaria v Reforma Agraria (Farming Development and Agricultural Reform 
Strategy) stated that: 
Agricultural Reform is the sword that cuts through the obstacles to developing pro-
ductive forces, the instrument by which cooperative formation and workers' participa-
tion are encouraged ... It is the principal tool of social and economic transformation in 
the Sandinista Popular Revolution. The process of transforming the social relation-
ships involved in agricultural production will establish the foundations for a new 
model of acquisition and will determine the development of the New Nicaraguan 
Economy ... All of this points to the industrialisation of natural resources.15 
In a revolutionary context the aims of the farming sector were threefold: self-
sufficiency in food production; the provision of hard currency through agricultural 
exports; and the social (and political) organisation of farm production. In fact, the 
Junta de Gobierno outlined precisely these aims shortly after the revolution: 
[We are referring to] the transformation of the structure of land tenure, to the elimina-
tion of land ownership without use and to the guaranteeing of access to such land by 
poor farmers. [We intend to] encourage associative relationships of productivity and to 
create a state sector as the axis of farming development... to elevate productivity lev-
els by means of dispersing technology and by the rational and intensive use of natural 
resources. [We aim to] create self-sufficiency in national food production and to in-
crease agricultural exports. It is also our intention to promote agro-industrial develop-
ment in order to increase the overall value of farming production, thereby improving 
both our intervention in the international market and the links between the primary and 
secondary sectors of our national economy.16 
In order to carry out the tasks outlined above, the Ministry of Agricultural De-
velopment (MIDA) was combined in 1979 with the Institute of Agricultural Re-
form (INRA) to form MIDINRA. This allowed for more efficient management, 
within the farming sector, of the new APP companies, cooperatives and individ-
ual producers. MIDINRA grew rapidly, setting up regional, departmental and lo-
cal delegations, increasing all of its administrative institutions. It became, in 
effect, a 'super-ministry' ( 'A state within a state' as it was referred to by many), 
with its own think-tank called CIERA (The Centre for Research into Agricul-
tural Reform), directed by Orlando Nunez. 
The Junta de Gobierno's first objective was to set up a broad-ranging state 
sector by means of confiscating the estates owned by Somoza and his allies. 
Nevertheless, a number of these estates had already been taken over by poor 
farmers during the uprising, who had formed cooperatives or divided the land 
into individual plots.17 However, at the end of 1979 the government decided to 
take control of these estates in order to create 'units of production' that would be 
directly managed by the state. The reasons given for such a decision were the 
need to maintain and take advantage of economies of scale, to channel all earn-
ings to the state for development investment and to convert the proletariat into 
the 'majority class' needed by the revolutionary project, thereby avoiding the re-
campesinizacion of the semi-proletariat.18 
15 MIDINRA (1982a), pp. 4-5. 
16 JGRN in Wheelock (1983). 
17 Serra (1990), p. 78. 
18 Deere, Marchetti and Reinhart (1986). 
The response of the peasant movement to the government's measures was not long 
in coming. In February 1980 thousands of peasants, organised by the Landworkers' 
Association (ATC), demonstrated at various locations throughout the Pacific zone. 
Their demands were for land, the right to keep the estates already taken over, an im-
provement in the credit terms on offer and the cancelling of peasant debt.19 In spite of 
this, the government not only rejected the fundamental demand — that of land (al-
though they did promise to address the issue in the near future by drawing up a new 
law related to agricultural reform), but also prohibited any further appropriation of land 
by peasants. The government additionally prohibited farmers from any further strike 
action. This move was aimed at keeping the peace with the middle classes and at 
maintaining a working relationship with international economic markets. 
As promised, two years after the triumph of the Revolution, the Ley de Re-
forma Agraria was passed, beginning a new chapter in the process of property 
transformation and in the 'estate for life' use of land. The new law allowed for 
action to be taken against all property that was 'in ownership without use, ineffi-
ciently exploited or inefficiently leased', as well as guaranteeing ownership to 
efficiently cultivated land. The beneficiaries of this law were basically three 
groups: the units of state production (the so-called Agricultural Reform Compa-
nies, or ERAs), peasants without land who were organised into cooperatives and 
— to a somewhat lesser extent — individual producers. 
MIDINRA was responsible for awarding land-owning certificates, el titiilo 
de reforma. This certificate was non-transferable except by inheritance. As a 
means of avoiding the break-up of land into smallholdings (through sale or other 
means), the certificate was also non-divisible in any form whatsoever. This was 
rapidly challenged by peasants who insisted on 'true ownership' of the land. 
MIDINRA, however, had other plans. It drew up the Marco Estrategico del De-
sarrollo Agropecuario,20 in which the 'precise objectives' for land distribution 
among the various productive sectors were set out. According to the Ministry, at 
the 'conclusion' of the Agricultural Reform in the year 2000, the APP would ac-
count for 27.4 per cent of the total farming area; the cooperative sector would 
take up 48.4 per cent (25.1 per cent for the Cooperativas Agrarias Sandinistas — 
CAS; 23.3 per cent for the Credit and Service Cooperatives — CCS); small and 
medium-scale producers would account for 18.2 per cent; and the large-scale 
producers would hold six per cent.21 
The application of land transformation — a process referred to as 'afectaciones' — 
developed swiftly once the 1981 Ley de Refbrma Agraria was passed. Between 1981 and 
1984, 349 estates were expropriated. This represented a total of 467,228 manzanas of 
land. As Tables 1 and 2 below indicate, the chief beneficiaries were nationalised compa-
nies and the CAS cooperatives.22 
19 Kaimowitz (1986), p. 140; Serra (1990), p. 79. 
20 Strategic Framework for Farming Development (MIDINRA, 1983c). 
21 MIDINRA (1983b, 1983c). 
22 Cardenal (1987). 
Table 1: Distribution of Land Affected by Agricultural Reform 
Oct. 1981 to Dec. 1982 70% 25% 5% 
Jan. to Dec. 1983 65% 33% 2% 
Jan to Dec. 1984 57% 40% 3% 
Source: Serra (1990), p. 80. 
Table 2: Evolution of the Structure of Land Ownership by Sector, 1978-84 
in thousands of manzanas 
Individual 8,073.0 100 5,125.2 64 
> 500 mzs. 2,920.0 36 1,025.7 13 
200-500 mzs. 1,311.0 16 1,021.0 13 
50-200 mzs. 2,431.0 30 2,391.0 30 
10-50mzs. 1,241.0 16 560.5 7 
< lOmzs. 170.0 2 127.0 1 
Cooperative - - 2,947.8 17 
CCS - - 804.3 10 
CAS - - 626.6 7 
State (APP) - - 1,516.9 19 
Total 8,073.0 100 8,073.0 100 
Source: Chief Executive Organisation for Agricultural Reform, Wheelock (1986b), p. 119. 
After 1982, the 'certification' for land of disputed ownership was also undertaken in 
the interior regions of the Atlantic Coast.23 This aimed at attracting part of the peas-
antry to the 'revolutionary policies', and also at undermining the incipient counter-
revolutionary movement. However, these aims were hardly successful at all, given 
the degree to which the Contra had already taken root and also the fact that the land 
certification on offer was non-negotiable. In the view of many peasants this simply 
23 Very little work has been carried out into the impact of the agricultural reform in the Atlantic coastal re-
gion. This is principally due to the great complexity involved in the management of communal lands, and to 
the importance of the historical demands made by the region's 4pueblos originarios\ Nevertheless, the 
work of Bulloven (1989) is particularly noteworthy. 
Dates AFP Coops Individual 
Peasants 
Sector 1 9 7 H t 9 7 H i 9 g 4 1 9 H 4 
Area % Area % 
denied access to true ownership. 'The government didn't give us any land: it only 
lent it out' was a criticism often made of Sandinista agricultural policy. 
Subsequently, with the worsening of the war in the interior rural zones (spe-
cifically in the eastern section of Nueva Segovia, Matagalpa and Chontales), a pro-
cess of displacement of the population was carried out. This opened another 
chapter in agricultural reform (with the Reforma a la Ley de Reforma Agraria, 
passed in 1986),24 in which the criteria of size and efficiency, established in the 
previous statute and applicable to the expropriation of estates, were eliminated. It 
also provided the government with greater scope for manoeuvrability in setting up 
cooperatives and settlements in the areas closest to the war. During the second half 
of the decade there was an observable shift in government priorities as the admini-
stration began to emphasise the political and defensive importance attached to the 
'transformation of the structure of ownership'. 
The Sandinista administration's policies: public investment, credit and commerciali-
sation 
Public investment in the farming sector was of particular importance in the 
1980s, reaching levels of 40 per cent of overall investment and 7.5 per cent of 
GDP (see Table 3). The government was initially successful in adequately bal-
ancing investment between the agricultural and industrial sectors, and between 
exports and consumption. However, a bias towards 'accumulation' quickly de-
veloped in which consumption was regarded as less important than productive 
investment. Another observable tendency was that of favouring the modern over 
the traditional sectors.25 
Table 3: Evolution of the Investment in Farming Set against Total Investment, 
1980-89 (in millions of cordobas) 
1980 5.8 36.8 
1981 5.3 32.1 
1982 5.7 36.5 
1983 7.1 33.9 
1984 9.0 41.6 
1985 8.5 37.9 
1986 12.4 52.2 
1987 12.5 53.1 
1988 6.0 51.9 
1989 2.4 23.0 
Source: General Planning Division in CIERA (1989i), p. 366. 
24 Law number 14,11 Januaiy 1986, published in its entirety in CIERA (1989h), pp. 97-110. 
25 Kleiterp (1988). 
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According to the Strategic Framework for Fanning Development,26 the aims of agri-
cultural transformation (planned to the year 2000) were to achieve self-sufficiency in 
food production, to develop agro-industry and to generate capital. In order to do this 
more efficiently, the concentration of all efforts on the public investment plan was 
considered paramount. Such efforts were essentially focused on the state sector, 
which accounted for 70 per cent of all investment; the cooperative and private sec-
tors accounting for 25 per cent and five per cent respectively. This bias towards the 
state sector increased in 1983, when the bulk of public investment was channelled 
towards large-scale agro-industrial projects (the so-called Proyectos del Programa de 
Inversiones Publicas, outlined in Table 4). In 1985, eight of these projects alone ab-
sorbed 56.4 per cent of the total investment figure, with a promised maturity of 6.6 
years.27 The option to invest in advanced technology was also established and upheld 
by MIDINRA as the quickest and most efficient means by which to increase farming 
performance and output. This approach was expressed in the following way: 
[In increasing milk production] ... We have two alternatives facing us: either we work 
with a herd of two million (as a national total), which is distributed in the most disorgan-
ised of ways and is in the hands of people who are not always open to new approaches... 
which would be as difficult for us as the efforts made throughout the 'literacy crusade'... 
or we go ahead with intensive farming methods ... And in the case of com and bean pro-
duction ... we are again faced with the same alternative ... the only viable option is to 
grow basic grain crops under irrigation and to use high technology farming methods.28 
Such a strategy — with its emphasis on mechanisation, the use of chemicals and 
irrigation — represented an investment in imports of capital and goods that was 
unequalled in Central America.29 In 1978, a total of 2,850 tractors were in use, 
with 63,882 hectares under irrigation; in 1987, there were 5,484 tractors working 
the land, while 96,025 hectares were under irrigation. This development chiefly 
benefited the APP which, in 1987, was in possession of 42 per cent of the trac-
tors, 60 per cent of the combine harvesters and 39 per cent of the agricultural 
tools in use throughout the country. This compares with respective figures of 13 
per cent, two per cent and 17 per cent for the cooperative sector.30 But in spite of 
this, overall production was less than hoped for; this was due to the worsening of 
the armed conflict, the irrational use of consumer and capital goods and the 
many technical and organisational limitations of the APP companies. In the sec-
ond half of the decade, despite the implementation of programmes and policies 
aimed at agricultural transformation and the optimisation of resources, the pro-
found economic crisis and the effects of the war wiped out most of the positive 
results that the new approaches had produced. 
26 MIDINRA (1983c). 
27 Serra (1990), p. 84; Utting (1988), p. 13. 
28 Wheelock (1986b), p. 48. 
29 Baumeister (1987, 1989). 
30 MIDINRA (1987c). 
Table 4. Public Investment Programme Projects (in millions of US dollars) 
Farming projects 131.8 
-Fanor Urroz I II Grain Domestic 33.4 1982-84 
-Plan Contingente I At national level Grain Domestic 21.5 1983-84 
-Plan Contingente II At national level Grain Domestic 29.9 1984-86 
-La Vigia I Grain Domestic 16.2 1984-88 
-Jalapa 1 Grain Domestic 13.0 1984-87 
-Waslala VI Grain Domestic 11.3 1982-86 
-Contingente Jalapa 1 Grain and 
canned pro-
duce 
Domestic 6.5 1984-89 
Dairy cattle projects 252 
-Muy-Muy 
/Matiguas 
VI Milk Domestic 126 1985-90 
-Chiltepe III Milk Domestic 60 1982-86 
-Leon Viejo-La Paz II Milk Domestic 36 1985-88 
-San Roque IV Milk Domestic 21.3 1985-87 
-Camoapa V Milk Domestic 8.7 1985-87 
Agroindustrial 499 
-Victoria de Julio III Sugar External 210.6 1982-87 
-Burley At national level Tobacco External 127.8 1983-89 
-Palma Kukra Hill ZE II Oil Domestic 52.9 1983-92 
-Palma El Castillo ZE III Oil Domestic 40.1 1983-92 
-Valle Sebaco VI Canned pro-
duce 
External 36.4 1983-87 
-Ifrugalsa IV Canned pro-
duce 
Mixed 15.9 1983-86 
-Cacao, Nueva 
Guinea 
V Cocoa External 9.4 1983-88 
-Cocotera ZE 11 Oil Domestic 5.9 1983-86 
TOTAL 883.8 
Source: Arguello and Kleiterp in CIERA (1989a), p. 345. 
Nationalisation of the banks at the end of 1979 allowed for new credit policies to 
be implemented. The Sistema Financiero Nacional was set up to oversee such 
policies and to control the money supply. As a result, bank financing of agricul-
ture extended from approximately 30 per cent in 1979 to 75 per cent in 1988. 
The provision of credit to broad sectors of the peasantry allowed poor farmers to 
free themselves from the grip of moneylenders. Another clear advantage was 
their subsequent ability to buy consumer goods and tools. In 1978, only 28,000 
peasants were in receipt of four per cent of the credit available, whereas in 1982 
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87,600 peasants were using 31 per cent of the short-term farming credit avail-
able. However, if one compares crop production financed by credit in the state, 
the large and medium-scale producers and peasant sectors, one can see that the 
peasantry accounted for a much lower proportion of the overall figure than the 
remaining two sectors. Within the peasantry, the cooperatives received the 
greater part of agricultural credit.31 Nevertheless, the use of credit — such as it 
was — in this sector represented a mechanism of control for MIDINRA. By re-
ceiving financial assistance, the peasantry became incorporated into the admini-
stration's overall plans and agricultural objectives. All cooperative production 
and investment plans had to be approved by specialists from the Banco Nacional 
de Desarrollo; the purchasing of consumer goods had to be carried out through 
state agencies and all commercialisation of products had to be directed through 
the state channels of the Empresa Nacional de Alimientos Basicos (ENABAS). 
ENABAS automatically discounted the credit previously supplied by the state 
from the purchase price given to farmers. 
By 1985 the administration's aims were to rationalise access to credit (which had 
ended up acting as a subsidy to producers, as it had an interest rate inferior to the rate 
of inflation). However, by 1987, given the depth of the economic crisis, long-term 
credit was restricted and was channelled exclusively through 20 production devel-
opment programmes. During the last two years of the decade, anti-inflation policies 
drastically reduced credit. This was aimed at trying to maintain the value of the cur-
rency, but also at promoting agricultural exports and investment. 
With regard to commercialisation policies, the government nationalised all for-
eign commerce, thereby gaining control of all agro-exports. This was carried out by 
channelling exports through specific companies, each given over to a particular sec-
tor. Until the second half of the 1980s, the government also held the firmest of grips 
on national commerce. According to the views set out by Orlando Nunez in Barri-
cada (9 December 1979) and Poder Sandinista (8 November 1979), these moves 
were aimed at the following: 
The complete removal from the scene of all middle-men, cash lenders and traders, 
who grew rich in the past by buying cheap and selling dear ... All of the resources 
that are now in the hands of the state will go towards increasing our economy's 
agricultural and industrial production. We will sell abroad only what we need to 
sell and buy only what is strictly necessary. Our aim is economic independence. 
In order to meet these objectives, the Ministry of National Commerce (MICOIN) set 
purchasing prices for producers with the aim of covering all costs and leaving a certain 
profit margin. Prices were also set for consumers, subsidising basic food products. 
These products were purchased by the use of a family card, known as the cartilla. As a 
result of this policy, referred to as seguridad alimentaria, there was also an increase in 
imports of basic foodstuffs: between 1979 and 1986, such imports doubled.32 
ENABAS, under the direction of MICOIN, carried out the storage and distri-
bution of basic consumption goods by means of a national network of stores, 
warehouses and points of sale. It was also responsible for establishing quotas for 
products that could be obtained, at a district and family level, by means of ration 
cards. This network, just as Nunez had argued, undermined traditional private 
31 Serra (1990), p. 143. 
32 Biondi-Morra (1990). 
commerce in the countryside. The problem was, however, that it was exactly this 
traditional commerce that tied country people to urban and regional markets. 
Such commerce had a number of different functions (related to supply, credit 
and commerce), all of which were based on personal relationships and an inti-
mate knowledge of peasants' requirements. This could not simply be replaced by 
a national network of specialised institutions, situated far from where the peas-
ants lived and run by urban administrative workers who knew little or nothing 
about their clients' reality or concerns. 
In an effort to control speculation, the sale of basic grain produce to 
ENABAS was made obligatory and the transporting of foodstuffs from one re-
gion to another was prohibited. These measures were swiftly rejected by the 
majority of the peasantry, bringing about a fall in production after 1981 and the 
development of a black market in direct competition with the state network, 
whose markets were characterised by the scarcity of produce on offer.33 
Throughout almost the entire decade, the urban-rural exchange shifted to the det-
riment of the peasantry. In 1979, for example, the cost of a pair of trousers and a shirt 
was the equivalent of 49 and 22 pounds of maize, respectively. By 1985, this had 
risen to respective levels of 230 and 140.34 But it was not only in the area of prices 
that rural collectives were affected: the national commercial network was clearly bi-
ased in the quality of supply offered to urban areas (which, in turn, reflected the bet-
ter organisation of urban collectives). Meanwhile, in its inability to provide the 
peasantry with basic requirements such as consumption goods or tools it generated 
situations of acute shortage in certain rural areas by the mid-1980s. 
The peasantry's demonstrations against the administration had some effect: 
from 1985 onwards national commerce policies began to be liberalised. By 1987 
there was a completely free market in basic grain produce. Consumer articles 
began filling the shelves once again, new government policies aimed at tighten-
ing up commercial efficiency and rationing were ended. Nevertheless, most 
products were now beyond the means of the greater part of the peasantry. 
The social organisation of production 
The other principal dimension to the Reforma Agraria was the transformation of the 
social organisation of production, and the ways in which agricultural producers be-
came politically 'linked' by means of guild organisations. Of particular importance 
was the creation of state production centres, the so-called Empresas de Reforma 
Agraria (ERAs), and the development of the cooperative movement. In the case of 
the cooperatives, there were a number of different types: production cooperatives 
(CAS), credit and service cooperatives (CCS) and agricultural 'defence' cooperatives 
(CAD), these last situated on the northern war fronts. The function of the CADs — 
in addition to that of agricultural production — was to respond to the attacks of the 
Contra. Other social collectives related to the agricultural world included the ATC, 
established before the revolution, and UNAG, (The National Union of Farmers and 
Livestock Breeders), founded in April 1981. 
The ERAs were a central element in national food production. They played a 
significant role in distribution, production and processing. As extensions of the gov-
33 Dore (1990), pp. 109-12. 
34 CIERA (1989i), pp. 373-80. 
ernment administration, they were considered reliable political instruments. They 
were also seen as faithful to the new aims of economic and food production policies. 
However, a report drawn up in the early years of the revolution claimed that 'the 
state economic complex and its managers came up against a number of difficulties in 
carrying out their objectives ... they also committed a number of errors'.35 In 1985, 
the difficulties alluded to increased, as indicated by the Plan Economico de 1985. 
This referred to the deterioration of the ERAs and mentioned a number of causes. 
One of these was the ongoing war, with its many direct and indirect consequences. 
Other factors were the 1985 trade embargo imposed by the USA, the decline in the 
terms of commercial exchange and the breakdown of the Central American Com-
mon Market. Not all of the causes were external in origin, however. The report also 
referred to important political and managerial errors, particularly underlining the per-
sistent losses incurred by the ERAs. The inability to pay interest on their mounting 
debts, the insufficient use of plants and processing machinery and the indifference 
that characterised workers' approaches to their jobs were also mentioned. Since these 
workers had been denied the right to own their land individually they exacted a kind 
of revenge by carrying out their duties in a 'pianissimo' manner — or, as the workers 
themselves put it, al suave. In effect, they took what was to be referred to ironically 
as 'la vacation historica'.36 
Henry Ruiz, Sandinista comandante and minister of planning, stated that the 
ERAs should 'satisfy the growing needs of our people ... be the very heart of the 
new accumulation and — as a consequence of the economia sandinista — gen-
erate social investment funds that allow for a process of 'autonomous accumula-
tion' ... creating economic surpluses that both strengthen the consolidation and 
expansion of the ERAs and also allow the people to share in the wealth created'. 
The problem was, however, that the ERAs almost never produced surpluses.37 
Table 5. Number of Cooperatives, Members and Land Cultivated in 1980 
12 441 1,311 883 2,647 77,358 164,202 mz. 
(*) CT= Colectivos de Trabajadores (Workers' Collectives), an organisation which was 
similar to the CCS. 
(**) Pre-Co-ops = units of productivity that were in the course of becoming cooperatives. 
Source: PROCAMPO-MIDINRA in Serra (1990). 
The cooperative movement developed at the time of Somoza's fall, when spon-
taneous occupations of large estates took place (as had already occurred before 
19 July 1979 in the zonas liberadas of Leon, Esteli and Chinandega). In the first 
few months neither the FSLN nor the state was able to assist the movement — in 
35 Austin, Fox and Kruger (1985). 
36 Biondi-Morra (1990), pp. 75-85. 
37 A study carried out by MIDINRA in 1981 indicated that, of the 49 companies with recently com-
pleted financial accounts, 38 were already operating with losses (MIDINRA in Biondi-Morra, 1990, 
pp. 103-4). 
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fact, they slowed it down. However, by July 1980 there were already 2,657 co-
operatives with 77,358 members. This provided the basis for official approval of 
what would be called the movimiento cooperativo.38 
With the passing of the 1981 Ley de Reforma Agraria, the cooperative 
movement was institutionalised. It was defined as 'a higher form of work or-
ganisation, giving impetus to the spirit of solidarity and cooperation, facilitating 
the peasants' active and organised participation, increasing production and 
helping in the development of education, health, housing and culture'.39 Ac-
cording to the law, any cooperative farming organisation was obliged to receive 
authorisation from the state agency PROCAMPO. Such strict control was due in 
part to the FSLN's hegemonistic intentions. But it was also due to the belief 
within the ministries that the cooperative movement needed to be subordinated 
to national planning and should form part of the services offered by the state. 
The movement was therefore assigned the role of producing basic grains and 
perishable foodstuffs and of providing a workforce for the large state companies 
within the area of agro-exports.40 As for its social function, according to those re-
sponsible for agricultural policy the cooperative movement represented the over-
coming of the 'backwardness' that characterised traditional units of peasant 
production. It is in this sense that the CCS or CAS were referred to as 'higher 
forms of social organisation'.41 
In spite of the attitudes expressed by UNAG,42 the strategy employed by 
MIDINRA until 1985 was to make the handing over of agricultural reform lands 
conditional on the formation of cooperatives. This violated the principles of volun-
tariedad and gradualidad set out in law. The institutional structure of the coopera-
tives themselves was reliant on external agents (technicians, professionals, political 
teams). This had the effect of limiting internal democracy and autonomy, as the fol-
lowing comments from a CAS cooperative worker in Comalapa indicate: 
The cooperative movement has had no voice, no one to speak on its behalf. Along 
came someone from the Reforma Agraria and they did just as they pleased; the 
same with the man from the battalion; the same with the man from the Frente. 
They set themselves up as our bosses.15 
In 1982, the first census of fanning cooperatives was carried out. At this time the co-
operative sector represented 50 per cent of the national peasantry, working on 22 per 
cent of the cultivable land in Nicaragua. The census indicated that peasants' main 
motivation for participating in farming cooperatives was the chance of improving 
their family's standard of living. Members felt that their organisation offered greater 
access to land, to credits and to the goods and appliances that would increase their 
38 See Serra (1990), who for years worked with UNAG, for a full analysis of the Nicaraguan coop-
erative movement from 1979 to 1990. 
39 CIERA (1989h). 
40 MIDINRA (1982a). 
41 Caballero (1982). 
42 UNAG was different from other Sandinista political and administrative organisations in that it fought 
hard to preserve a certain degree of autonomy for the cooperative movement and for the interests of peasant 
collectives. In time, UNAG's characteristic defence of its members resulted in a number of conflicts with 
the administration. See Blookland (1992). 
15 Serra (1990), p. 146: 'El movimiento cooperativo ha estado sin cara, sin alguien que hablara por 
el. Llegaba alguien de Reforma Agraria y hacfa lo que queria, el hombre del batallon tambien, el 
hombre del Frente tambien se imponfa como mandador.' 
ability to work the land. The possibility of keeping part of the surplus and the appar-
ent stability of the work on offer were also key factors. Finally, the perception ex-
isted that the cooperatives were the best way in which individual members could 
satisfy their particular needs and that the state reserved a somewhat preferential 
treatment for such associations. 
The greater part of the existing cooperatives were CCS (45 per cent), made 
up of farmers from the interior region, either tenants or in possession of their 
own land. Each cooperative had an average of 32.6 members. The CAS groups 
(20 per cent) were smaller. They averaged 14 members per association and were 
largely composed of poor farmers or agricultural workers cultivating the lands 
assigned to them by the Agricultural Reform. The CAS were essentially concen-
trated in the Pacific region. Basic grains were the main produce of the coopera-
tives (78 per cent of produce). Most of this was sold (53 per cent), especially in 
the case of the CAS cooperatives.43 
The political and guild activity of these collectives was based around the ATC 
and, later, around UNAG. The ATC promoted and represented agricultural workers 
(principally from the ERAs) on various bodies set up in 1980 by the government. 
These included the Legislative Assembly (the Consejo de Estado) and a number of 
sectorial production committees. In its first National Assembly, held in December 
1979, the ATC approved its statutes and set out its priorities and tasks. Yet in spite of 
the ATC's composition, a large group of peasants — particularly from the country's 
central region — did not feel fully identified with the organisation. This was due in 
part to its composition and interests, but also to the political discourse that it ex-
pressed, appealing as it did to the agricultural proletariat, in clear detriment to those 
who owned (and wanted to keep) the little land that was theirs. 
This discontent was seized upon by a section of the agricultural middle class un-
sympathetic to the revolution. Those who felt excluded by the attitudes that the ATC 
expressed were 'recruited' by guild groups such as the Nicaraguan Union of Agri-
culture and Farm Producers (UPANIC). UPANIC swiftly set up a coffee growers' 
cooperative in Matagalpa. In response, the government felt the need to create an or-
ganisation closely linked to Sandinismo (as well as to the cooperative movement as a 
whole) representing small and mid-scale producers, that would counterbalance the 
effects of UPANIC. UNAG was formed in April 1981 at an inter-regional assembly 
of farmers. Its motto was 'Motherland, Unity and Production', and it defined itself as 
a broad-ranging and pluralistic organisation representing small to mid-scale agricul-
tural producers. It was also made very clear, however, that the organisation 'recog-
nises the FSLN as the leader of our people'.44 
In spite of the competition between the two organisations, a considerable 
number of poor farmers unaffiliated to the cooperative movement remained on 
the fringes of both the ATC (which focused its attentions on the permanent sala-
ried workers, in particular on the ERAs) and UNAG (which, from the outset, had 
given priority to the slightly better-off farmers and to the cooperative movement 
as a whole). Fierce debates took place from the beginning of the 1980s within 
both organisations. The arguments centred on exactly who should be responsible 
for organising, representing and protecting the interests of the impoverished 
sector from the interior rural zones. UNAG maintained that such a group could 
43 Serra (1990), p. 141. 
44 UNAG (1981). 
not successfully be integrated into the same organisation as better-off coopera-
tivised farmers. And the ATC argued that the alianza obrero-campesina should 
not include small-scale peasant farmers who, in general, held the most traditional 
of political and social views. In practice, both organisations effectively aban-
doned the poorer peasants. In time these very farmers, unwelcomed by UNAG 
and the ATC, became the social base for the Contra movement. 
The grass-roots leaders of both the ATC and UNAG tended to be 'natural lead-
ers' from the zones they represented, whose force of personality enabled them to 
weld together a group of peasant farmers unified by bonds of family. Such leaders 
voluntarily pursued their members' demands within the various municipal organisa-
tions. They also passed on the 'orientations' and 'lines of policy' handed down by 
their superiors. Mass mobilisation was carried out only when required. Intermediate 
political positions were almost always filled by FSLN members nominated by the 
party, while national directors were put forward by the FSLN's National Directorate. 
This undermined the development of internal democracy in local organisations, 
above all because the work plans pursued were adaptations of strategies adopted by 
MIDINRA at regional and national levels. Yet despite the tendency towards an ever-
increasing bureaucracy and the concentration of power in the hands of the directors, 
considerable freedom of expression existed at the grass roots. In spite of the limita-
tions, UNAG effectively doubled its membership between 1981 and 1985, from 
45,498 members to approximately 75,000. The ATC managed to maintain its mem-
bership at about 40,000 throughout the 1980s.45 
Clearly the revolution — with all its limitations — implied a rapid move towards 
political participation and organisation for a sizeable part of the peasant-farming 
sector. However, this process was by no means lineal, but was rather characterised 
by highs and lows, contradictions and limitations and incomprehension on the part of 
certain members of the peasantry when faced with new developments. 
From the perspective of the peasant farmers, the reproduction of old social 
structures ran parallel to the creation of a new society. If on the one hand a dis-
mantling of the repressive governmental 'apparatus' that had characterised So-
mocismo occurred, on the other hand there was a marked increase in the political 
directives issued by the FSLN. In addition, for the first time in the nation's his-
tory, state institutions had the necessary finance, technology and capacity to 
carry out wide-ranging policies. While it was certainly the case that cooperatives 
and other collective organisations were created primarily to represent the inter-
ests of the rural population, there were still many peasant farmers who kept up 
the fight to obtain their own plots of land and to gain access to the resources that 
remained concentrated in state and private haciendas. All of this within a politi-
cal system that was run along vanguardist lines, albeit with cooperative traits. 
The FSLN essentially offered material goods and other symbols in exchange for 
control over local leaders, so reproducing the age-old secular client relationships 
between those who held power and those who were subjected to it. 
Part of the cooperative and guild movement, especially UNAG, was efficient in 
communicating and representing the peasant sector's demands and preoccupations. 
Yet state institutions responsible for implementing and overseeing agricultural policy 
confronted a number of problems. Specifically, widespread misunderstanding ex-
isted on the part of the administration both as to the characteristics of national agri-
45 CIERA (1989f), p. 376. 
cultural production and the nature of those involved in such production. This ex-
tended to a failure to comprehend the importance of farmers in crop production, and 
their capabilities and limitations.46 The agricultural policies drawn up and imple-
mented by the Sandinistas suffered from a number of diagnostic errors: overestimat-
ing the productive importance of the estates inherited from Somoza and his 
associates (which constituted the bulk of the state sector's farmland); an exaggeration 
of the rural middle-classes' economic importance; and underestimation of the pro-
ductive importance of small to medium-scale farmers and livestock breeders. 
To what can we attribute these errors? According to Bauermeister (1988a), three 
factors were critical. First, the political weight held by sectors of the rural elite that 
formed part of the Sandinista Alliance. These people were professionals, linked by 
family or work to the most technologically advanced sectors of pre-1979 Nicaraguan 
agriculture. As a result of their support for the revolutionary coalition during the in-
surrection they came to hold senior posts within the public sector. They were liberal 
professionals who had trained in North American universities and political activists 
schooled in the former Eastern Bloc (which was a considerable source of finance for 
many of the larger agro-industrial projects). Secondly, the ideological adherence to 
dependency theory and certain Marxist frameworks of explanation. This framework 
influenced interpretations of 'underdevelopment' and the need for the development 
of productive forces. Finally, the analyses undertaken to interpret both the general 
economic situation and the alliances with specific social sectors were over-
politicised. This, in turn, created a distorted view of reality, above all with regard to 
the productive importance that was attached to various sectors. 
From the very outset of the revolution, the formulation of public policies was 
practically the monopoly of professionals and technicians. This group encouraged 
a process of 'accelerated modernisation' based on the idea that the economic 
'backwardness' of traditional Nicaraguan agriculture could only be overcome by 
creating a powerful state sector that would, little by little, absorb the old. The peas-
antry would thus become part of the nation's labour force, working in the large 
state companies, and the remaining units of production (above all, private con-
cerns) would be marginalised. The abilities of autonomous, small-scale agricul-
tural producers were wholly misjudged. Known in Nicaragua as chapiolios 
(something similar to 'plebeian', 'peasant', 'Indian', 'half-caste'), they were con-
sidered alien to the process of modernisation and progress, ignored by agricultural 
technicians and capital city dwellers alike.47 
The Peasant Country and the impact of the agricultural reforms 
The Peasant Country 
Ortega and Marchetti, two agricultural experts linked to the Sandinista admini-
stration, have both made the point that the triumph of the revolution was needed 
before peasants were able to participate economically, politically and socially at 
national level. For the first time in their history they were able to collaborate in 
46 Baumeister (1988a, 1988c, 1989). 
47 The technicians, in turn, were referred to as cheles. This word (perhaps an inversion of 'leche': milk) is 
used to designate all fair-skinned people, but it also has very clear social connotations given that the 'white' 
population in Nicaragua accounts for only 7-9% of the total. Most Nicaraguan cheles come from the tradi-
tional economic elite, the so-called 'pigmentocracia'. 
projects that did not 'belong' to landowners or priests. With the coming of the 
revolution, other advantages also arrived: young men and women from the city 
to help in the tasks of literacy, school for the children, health conferences and 
workshops, the union, the cooperative, credit and land. Nevertheless, great 
though these opportunities were, they were often under-exploited and even mis-
interpreted. This was due largely to the fact that the authorities failed to appreci-
ate the importance of two basic factors: the local area, la comarca, the 
fundamental element in peasant civil society and the network of intermediation 
that the rural world represented. 
Map 3: The Peasant Country 
The comarca was the basis of peasant society, the area within which land, produc-
tion, the family, the individual and the community were connected. In contrast to the 
view of peasant society as isolated and marginalised, the comarca was the area 
in which a rich fabric of relationships and connections were inter-woven. These 
included family links, but also guild groups, economic organisations and organi-
sations given over to political solidarity. Isolation was not an obstacle to com-
munity life; indeed precisely because of their isolation, peasants were obliged to 
construct a more cohesive society, through networks of intermediation.48 
In Nicaragua, the Peasant Country was created by eastward expansion within 
the departaments of Esteli, Jinotega, Matagalpa, Boaco and Chontales — and 
also within the enclaves of Nueva Guinea. This had occurred either through the 
penetration of traditional haciendas in areas previously inhabited by poor farm-
ers who subsequently became colonists or through the arrival of waves of immi-
grant peasant workers who conquered marginal territory and virgin mountain 
lands in order to produce grain, coffee, cocoa and livestock. 
Both of these phenomena involved an extensive exploitation of land, steadily 
progressing towards the agricultural frontiers. In the process a new social subject 
was created: the finquero of peasant origin. From the 1950s onwards, a stream of 
poor farmers expelled from the lands around the cities of Boaco, Juigalpa, Darfo 
and Terrabona, moved up into the mountains, forcing back the agricultural fron-
tiers by sheer force of labour. Fifteen or twenty years' hard work by some of 
these workers resulted in their transformation from campesino to finquero. An-
other way to social and economic stability was the transportation of goods by 
mules from the larger cities to the comarca. Savings were then used to buy the 
rights to own land and livestock. 
Peasants who had by these means become finqueros or livestock breeders nev-
ertheless remained very much part of peasant life. They lived in the country amongst 
the peasant population, worked from sunrise to sunset with everyone else and ate un-
der the same roof as the others. In this way, their importance was not simply limited 
to that of mediators in the economic life of their community: they were also seen as 
'models to follow', as 'leaders' of their comarca. It is also important to note that, un-
like the large landowners, such figures rarely allied themselves to Somoza's regime. 
Their links to the government before 1979 were basically administrative. The fin-
quero, or 'the rural middle class', was a central feature of life in the region. Another 
important element in the social structure of the Peasant Country was the colono, that 
is, the peasant farmer without his own land or house. Moving from estate to estate, 
offering his labour as he went, the colono was able to grow food for his own needs. 
This group was almost wholly dependent on the finquero. There was, in fact, a strong 
measure of paternalism in the relationship between the two, the colono hoping for 
the day in which his finquero might allow him to buy a plot of land — in instalments 
— and so become a landowner himself. In general, the colono could be largely as-
sured of the finquero's help as labour was in short supply, and so his labour was an 
important commodity. This strengthened the client-worker links between the two 
groups. The 'agricultural proletariat' and the 'masses of semi-proletariatised peas-
48 Theodor Shanin points out the essential 'duality' present in peasant life: on the one hand the peas-
ant belongs to a social class which is considered subordinate to the majority and, on the other, the peasant 
belongs to a 'closed world with its own codes and autonomous social relationships'. This is reflected in the 
ideas of 'brotherhood versus economic competition' (Maine); 'societies based on the family versus societies 
based on the individual' (Coulange); 'Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft' (Tonnies); or 'mechanical socie-
ties versus organic societies' (Durkheim). See Bastiansen (1991), p. 49. 
ants' to whom the revolution made its appeal simply did not exist, or if they did they 
were an insignificant minority. 
This was an isolated and closed society, poorly supplied with basic services 
and largely ignored by state institutions.49 The Peasant Country was a society of 
relationships based on mutual need in which power lay in the hands of those who 
held the most land and livestock and the greatest access to the market. This power 
was in turn based on the idea of personal sacrifice as a central element in personal 
progress. The conditions under which migrants established and developed their 
farms on the agriculture frontier reinforced their peasant identity and distinct way 
of life; in particular their ties to the land and values of hard work, autonomy, patri-
archy, paternalistic ties and extended family and community loyalties. While this 
peasant identity appears to have been particularly strong on the agricultural fron-
tier, several studies suggest that elements of this culture were more generalised 
throughout Nicaragua's mountainous interior.50 
This social milieu was also marked by a belief in destiny and divine justice. The 
finquero's 'favour' was the action that solved the colono's difficulties (land distribu-
tion, a share in the profits or access to the market). And it was the finquero who acted 
as the mediator between the urban world and that of the peasants. Three institutions 
controlled mediation between the community and the world beyond: the 'patron', the 
market and the church. Each of these exercised control through systems of media-
tion, but in every case the personal dimension of control was of most importance. 
The colono dealt with the businessman, the finquero and the cura (and later, the 
'delegate of the word'). These were relationships of subordination, which, neverthe-
less, were not openly antagonistic. They were based around loyalty, a respect for the 
strongest and a paternalistic assistance for the weakest. What counted in the Peasant 
Country was the 'identity of occupation', in opposition to class identity, as E.P. 
Thompson (1979) observed in his characterisation of the class struggle in pre-
capitalist and clientelistic societies.51 
Even increased rural stratification did not necessarily rupture cross-class com-
munity ties, but rather led to adaptation of a complex web of clientelistic relation-
ships between well-off and poor peasants. Patron-client ties and mutual aid 
between peasants of relatively equal status in the central highlands were not simply 
ideological remnants from an earlier era, but instead continued to serve the eco-
nomic and social needs of the population, even as market forces increasingly 
penetrated the zone. As Horton suggests, for poor peasants such relationships had 
both an affective dimension and represented a means to mitigate the growing eco-
nomic insecurity they faced.52 As Kaimowitz stated, 'the exchanges involved were 
typically unequal but were the only available source of land, support in times of 
crisis and scarce commodities, and were cemented by an elaborated ideological 
foundation based on kinship and dependence'.53 In a study of the neighbouring 
49 In 1976 in Matiguas/Muy Muy, a municipal district in the Matagalpa district, with a total area of 
2,008 km2, there was no electricity, no drinking water, no postal services, no telephone, no telegram 
services, no hospitals nor any institutional services of any kind. And there were only 18 schools with 
a total number of 20 teachers. This in a town with a population of 47,104 inhabitants. 
50 CIERA (1989f), pp. 284-7. 
51 There is little bibliography on clientilism and pre-capitalist societies in Central America, but the 
work of Segundo Montes (1987) is useful. 
52 See Horton (1998), pp. 55-61. 
53 Kaimowitz (1988), p. 118. 
municipality of Wiwilf, Keller also identified a complex chain of clientelistic ties 
in which, for example, a middle peasant might be the client of a finquero and at the 
same time serve as a patron for poorer peasants in his community.54 According to 
Quilali residents, clientelistic ties were particularly strong between colonos who 
often lived on the same farm for a number of years and the finquero patrones with 
whom they worked. In the words of poor peasant Noris Pardo: 'People respect 
their patrons. They were like your family, your father. We were the same, all on 
the same level. And no one spoke out or complained. He [the patron] told you, "I'll 
give you this much", and no one ever complained.'55 As this comment suggests, 
many poor peasants depended on local elites not only in a concrete material sense 
for access to land, loans and services, but also as transmitters of ideals and values. 
The FSLN and its revolution 
The agrarian character of the Peasant Country can be resumed in three principal 
traits: its isolation; the presence and attitudes of the colonos; and the area of the 
comarca, in which social and economic developments were acted out. It was a 
place characterised by a strong individualism (based on the perception of one's 
own strength as central to personal progress) and an equally strong neutrality to-
wards events beyond the rural world. 
The only external institution with a marked and continued presence in the re-
gion was the Catholic Church. In the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Church began to develop its structures within various comarcas. The first phase 
of this development was the construction of chapels, followed by the introduc-
tion of Catholic Action during the 1950s and '60s and finally, the organisation of 
peasants into groups such as the delegates of the word.56 In this sense it was al-
most always the parish that initiated and encouraged development schemes, 
building bridges, roads and schools, or encouraging education and health initia-
tives. One of the most important results of these Church activities was the for-
mation of local leaders, the 'delegates of the word'. Once established, they 
tended to control access to the community. This created yet another level of me-
diation, one that was accepted by the inhabitants who looked to the delegates for 
guidance. It was precisely because of these networks that the FSLN guerrillas 
were able to survive in certain rural areas during the 1960s and '70s. 
Prior to the revolution the FSLN developed a network of supporters, which, in 
turn, allowed the guerrillas to perceive the codes of conduct within peasant society. 
Although the guerrillas were from the outside world, many of them from the larger 
towns, their relationship with the local inhabitants was always respectful: they 
worked with the peasants, shared their accommodation and their concerns, and — 
above all — established strong affective links with their hosts. While there were 
never any promises of material benefits for those who helped the FSLN, there was a 
tacit expectation on the part of the collaborators that some kind of reward might be at 
hand. The day that the revolution finally triumphed, they thought, would be the day 
54 Keller (1986), p. 189. 
55 Cited in Horton (1998), p. 56. 
56 Little systematised information exists about this process, which varied from one municipal de-
partment to another. The work carried out by CIERA (1985) into the peasant movement in Matiguas 
provides some data. 
that a share in running their own lives might finally come their way, as the following 
comments indicate: 
I joined up without expecting anything in return ... but one day Comandante Vic-
tor Tirado said to me ... 'when we win, you'll be mayor'. 
I was really poor, and I was hoping that, with the revolution, there'd be a change, 
and things would get better for me. 
Carlos Fonseca told us that when we had won, there would be no peasants without 
land and no land without men to work it.57 
However, when victory came, the peasant collaborators — los colaboradores 
historicos — were effectively abandoned. The deception was all the greater as it 
went against their basic code of mutual help. The leaders with whom they had 
shared so much — men and women who were now famous and could be heard 
speaking on the radio — would never again return. In their place came another 
'breed' of outsiders: 
When the revolution won, we knew then that our brothers, our sons, were leaders, 
would never come back again. Others came to the area to give orders and to run 
things. They were younger and it was as if they spoke another language; they 
were different... and they simply didn't take us into account.58 
Initially this change brought about a strong sense of disappointment and, in some 
cases, resentment. Many peasants were later to see their economic circumstances 
undergo progressive deterioration, frustrating their hopes for a better life. 
However, the triumph of the revolution was followed by an initial phase of 
euphoria. Local church leaders joined the revolutionary organisations operating 
at a local level, such as the Sandinista Defence Committees (CDS). Peasants 
would come down from the hills to attend municipal meetings and lent out their 
mules to the new authorities. Their houses also provided shelter for the literacy 
brigades. Young men and women participated as health brigade members. The 
colonos continued to work, now on the lands from the confiscated former es-
tates. And in certain areas, indigenous peoples began to claim their historical ter-
ritories. This did not last long. The CDS and the municipal committees enabled a 
direct link to be forged between the new administrative power and the peasantry. 
Yet these organisations had been drawn up by the Sandinistas to act in the same 
fashion as in the cities and towns: they were groups given over to political and 
social mobilisation. The peasants, seeing that few concrete answers to their 
problems were forthcoming, quickly stopped attending the meetings. Within a 
short time, the only peasant members involved were the presidents who increas-
ingly began to question their role: 
At the beginning of the revolution we worked far more happily and enthusiastically. 
We met other peasants, holding meetings in our houses: we felt fulfilled. In those days, 
we had no idea what a CDS was. There was a meeting where Mario Amador ... came 
to see me with three soldiers. They began telling us that we had to form a group, some 
kind of organisation ... They said: 'You're going to form a CDS'. I had no idea what 
that was, so I said that they would have to explain it to me first. But they replied: 
'Look, if you accept it, your people will get help'. So of course I said yes. They sent 
57 CIERA (1985), p. 105. 
58 Ibid., p. 107. 
me off to Matagalpa to find out just what this thing was. Someone there from the 
Frente Sandinista explained it all to me. I backed out of it immediately and went 
home. I didn't like it because they told me that I'd have to be 'the ears and the 
eyes of the revolution'; they said that it was a way to keep control of the people in 
the area. So it wasn't anything to do with getting help at all. I reckoned that it was 
all a mistake and that it was better to get away from there.59 
I took part in the uprising. I was young. My brother and me took our rifles and 
slogged it out with the guardia. And when we won, it was something very sweet... but 
when the party members came up from the city and started to tell me what I could or 
couldn't do, well, that began to get my back up. Nobody ordered me to fight against 
Somoza, and nobody's going to give me orders right here on my very own flnca-60 
Revolutionary institutionalism in the Peasant Country operated through two or-
ganisations: the National Development Bank (BND) and the distribution agency 
for public supplies, PROCAMPO. However, neither of these organisations took 
the comarca or the family unit as their base. Instead, they were founded on the 
cooperative, which simultaneously linked them to the new state apparatus cen-
tred in the local towns. Leaders of the ATC, arriving from the Pacific, were dis-
concerted to find that the field workers and colonos had no wish to become 
members of the proletariat, preferring — on the contrary — to work as farmers. 
It also came as a surprise to learn that their demands were for their own land to 
cultivate their own produce, and that the land they preferred was that belonging 
to the state, not to the 'patron'. Another area of discrepancy came about when 
representatives of the agricultural unions limited their support to the coopera-
tives and the ERAs. The 'members and workers' of these groups were far from 
satisfied with this attitude, as the comments below indicate. These workers had 
not received their promised plots of land from the FSLN: 
I stayed on as a colono in Jobo, where I had my little piece of land to earn a living 
from ... When I was in the State Company, the administrator said that we were all 
employees and that if we used the land for ourselves, we would destroy the pas-
ture when we burnt it... but we had always worked that way... 
All of the work collectives fell apart within a year of starting up because the financing 
was cut and we got into debt. We had to sell off part of our produce just to pay our 
credit bills. It was all the fault of bad organisation ... there was no coordination, no 
support from the state and — to be honest — I never really understood what the coop-
erative was all about anyway. 
In the first months of the revolution no encouragement was given to the peasant 
movement. Instead efforts were directed at grouping the peasants into organisations 
that were directed from the city and the state. Within this framework, certain 
Sandinista members — generally young and urban — limited their activities to the 
centres of the towns, their discourse largely unconnected to the specific problems en-
countered by the peasant communities surrounding them. Unsurprisingly, a number 
of peasants criticised these 'urban' Sandinistas, claiming that 'many of them learned 
59 Taken from an interview with Pedro Turin Blandon who was later to join the Contra (Bendana, 
1991, pp. 129—62). 
60 Evidence given by a finquero from Matiguas who had joined the FSLN in the period immediately fol-
lowing the successful outcome of the revolution, but who subsequently distanced himself from the move-
ment at the beginning of 1980. He was later to leave the country altogether, returning only in 1990. 
a lot about writing detailed reports, but not a thing about getting to grips with the 
problems that faced us in the places where we lived'.61 
While in rural Nicaragua there was widespread euphoria and celebration at 
the defeat of the 40-year Somoza dictatorship, the many demands on the new 
revolutionary government limited the material and human resources available to 
the municipalities. The power vacuum created by the collapse of the political 
and economic structures of Somocismo in the central and northern highlands was 
largely filled by inexperienced personnel, many of whom were outsiders to the 
zone. Soon after taking power, FSLN departmental authorities appointed a num-
ber of political secretaries to head the party in these areas. Most were young 
people from the Pacific coastal cities, committed to the revolution, but unfamil-
iar with the culture of Nicaragua's rural interior. Keller describes, for example, 
an urban ATC official who arrived in the municipality of Wiwilf in 1980 and 
gave long speeches punctuated with jargon and political slogans that promptly 
put the assembled peasants to sleep and who eventually alienated the population 
with his domineering attitude.62 Horton provides a further example from Quilali, 
where the person who served as FSLN political secretary in early 1980 was 
originally from Leon; he came to the northern mountains for the first time as part 
of the 1980 literacy campaign and was only later assigned to Quilali.63 
The decision taken by the FSLN to give priority to party loyalty by placing 
inexperienced activists in certain zones, rather than taking advantage of the ex-
ist ing network of local leaders, proved a serious miscalculation. Activists 
needed to be able to talk the language of the comarca, to speak easily about fri-
joles, farm animals, types of corn and the difficulties of each passing season. 
Many party members, however, closed themselves off from the reality of the ru-
ral world and focused instead on demanding politically 'correct' behaviour and 
attitudes. After losing the 1990 elections, a good number of Sandinistas came to 
realise — far too late — just how badly they had run things at the time. 
However, by far the most negative measures to affect the farmers were the con-
fiscation of land and the commercial policies adopted. Both had serious conse-
quences for every individual involved in the complex chain of agricultural and 
commercial connections, and ultimately brought about the first breakdown between 
the revolutionary project and the peasants.64 The confiscation of lands was directed at 
those who had been 'part' of the old regime. The problem, however, was that a good 
number of people who had held positions within the local administration (justices of 
the peace, presidents of the regional election bodies) were not necessarily connected 
to Somocismo or its history of repression. Many of the 'victims' of confiscation were 
simply the intermediaries between their society and the former government. Natu-
rally, large landowners and the middle-classes had their estates confiscated, but so 
too did the finqueros, to whom everyone owed a favour. MIDINRA applied a policy 
of confiscation across the board that paid no attention to social context. 
At the same time, news of questionable confiscations spread rapidly amongst 
the townsfolk, causing great consternation. People would gather to talk over the 
latest details in the town square in hushed tones. This is how dona Celia recalled 
61 Mendoza (1990), p. 36. 
62 Keller (1986), p. 228. 
63 Horton (1998), p. 78. 
64 CIERA (1985), p. 117. 
the confiscation of the farmstead and lands belonging to a local, elderly finquero 
who, with no family of his own, had given support to a considerable number of 
poorer people, often helping to pay for the education of the peasants' children.65 
That's all anyone talked about that week: they've taken away don Facundo's lands. 
'Facundo! But he's always helped us out!' we all said. But, you know, the Frente 
authorities weren't around at the time, and anyway, we didn't dare say anything 
against them. But it was a great shame, and we all felt the same way about it. 
After three or four confiscations, the finqueros felt themselves to be under threat 
and the cry went out that 'the revolution is communist, they're taking everyone's 
land; it's all going to end up in the hands of the state'. These measures effec-
tively disarticulated peasant society, generating a widely-felt sense of resentment 
which proved a godsend to the counterrevolutionary coalition. 
The other area of policy that had a negative impact was that of commerce. 
The Sandinistas wanted to eliminate the figure of the intermediary — the 'mid-
dle-man' — who, according to MIDINRA's world-view, represented the ex-
ploitation of the peasant farmers. This ignored the fact that such people were, 
more accurately, the central figure around which the entire commercial process 
was built. The intermediaries were not obscure figures of exploitation, nor were 
they the strongmen of the comarca; they were — simply but crucially — the 
people who bought the mountain produce, who put the peasant family in contact 
with the comarca, the comarca in contact with the municipal region and the mu-
nicipal region in contact with the outside world. Once ENABAS had set up its 
purchasing and sales monopoly, the traditional networks of commerce that 
crossed the mountain regions were broken, constituting a severe blow to the 
peasant economy. On the other hand, however, government clerks and adminis-
trators — above all those employed in security services — were accustomed to 
acquire foodstuffs and other products, which were then passed from one depart-
ment to another without the slightest difficulty, free from the need to report to 
anyone and from the fear of confiscation. Years later, a former member of the 
Direction General de la Seguridad del Estado (DGSE) who was working in Re-
gion V recalled how these practices caused considerable indignation amongst the 
local peasant population: 
I spent months wandering from one department to another, and I always carried 
things around with me: eggs, cheese, vegetables ... Because I was in the DGSE 
and I was working, I had no problems. No one ever asked me what I was doing 
walking about with all that stuff. But if any of the peasants had tried to do the 
same, I'm absolutely sure that they'd have had the whole lot confiscated at an 
army checkpoint. That's the way it was ...66 
In this way the community began to identify the state as responsible for the undoing 
of mountain commerce. The free sale of coffee was prohibited, so too was that of co-
coa and basic grains. Traditional traders felt themselves to be persecuted. Worse, 
however, was the fact that in many areas of the country the state was unable to re-
place what it had so effectively undone. The chain of supply and commerce was fre-
quently incomplete and the position of the mediator was left unfilled, since its 
65 Taken from an interview with dona Celia Porras Leon (1992). 
66 Taken from a conversation in 1996 with a former teacher of sociology at the UCA who had 
worked in the Ministry of the Interior (MINT) between 1979 and 1990. 
impor tance had never been recognised or unders tood. This p rovoked an acute 
sense of insecuri ty and anxiety a m o n g the peasants , who were now unsure about 
h o w to sell their crops and how, therefore , to support their famil ies . The tradi-
t ional mechan i sms had been swept away, but nothing had replaced them: 
One day the guys from MICOIN came along and they told me to sell the crops to them, 
and that I couldn't sell anything in town anymore. 'Come off it! That's just stupid,' I said. 
'Look, it was me who bought the seeds, me who planted them and me who grew all this 
stuff. Nobody gave me anything for free. So I reckon I've got the right to sell to whoever 
I want, wherever I want.' I've seen how these guys make a fortune in a couple of min-
utes, while we're sweating our backs off here, month after month, just to get by. And 
now here's those jodidos from MICOIN telling me to sell to them...67 
T h e disrupt ion of pre-exist ing commerc ia l l inks contr ibuted to a worsening of 
peasan t s ' l iving standards, supply l inks were broken or inadequate and inf lat ion 
began to soar. Discontent began to grow. The general fee l ing a m o n g the peasants 
was that it was the local people , poor and now unable to support themselves , su-
friendo con esta revolution,68 
T h e situation put the peasantry into an absurd, almost Ka fkaesque situation, 
as Marchet t i pointed out: 
A peasant wants to buy a pair of trousers. He has to go to the BND, on the day 
that his CCS tells him, to get some money. The bank tells him that there's no 
money for trousers, only money for sowing maize. The peasant accepts the deal: 
he says that he'll sow maize, although he really only wants the trousers. But when 
he gets to town, he finds out that they're too expensive, and anyway, they don't fit 
him. So off he goes to the parish to see if Padre Antonio has brought some clothes 
back from Italy. There aren't any. So then he goes to PROAGRO to get some 
things he'll need to sow the maize. They don't have a grinding file for his ma-
chete, so he goes back home and sharpens his machete with another, older file. 
Two hours later, it breaks because it hadn't been properly sharpened. But in the 
end, he harvests his maize only to find that, instead of having two or three traders 
fighting to get it from him at a good price, he has to borrow a donkey to take it to 
ENABAS. And when he's there, they pay him a ridiculously low price. The clerk 
tells him that grain prices are kept low so that inflation in the towns doesn't get 
out of hand; this way they can make sure that the price of trousers doesn't keep on 
climbing. The peasant asks if there are any trousers in town now. ENABAS tells 
him that he'll have to ask Senor Bartolo, in the MICOIN store. Bartolo tells him 
that the trousers cost 1,600 a pair and that they'll be in the store in about two 
month's time. The peasant puts his coins in his pocket, decides not to cancel his 
loan with the BND and sets off for the bar to drink a little guaro.69 
Rural peop le v iewed the state with increasing suspicion: in addit ion to conf is -
cat ing land f r o m ' innocen t ' people and provoking ineff ic ient and insuff ic ient 
c o m m e r c e , it was directly undermin ing the ' log ic ' of peasant life. There was also 
a c lear re t icence and fear on the part of the adminis t ra t ion to m o v e into the inte-
r ior regions. Consequent ly , in certain rural areas, the Contra fi l led that space. 
67 Taken from a conversation with peasant farmers in the area of Copalar. 
68 Taken from a conversation with the manager of the supply point in Las Limas, Matiguas. 
69 A report in CIERA (1985), p. 205. 
Peasants on the agricultural frontier: the build-up of the Peasant-Contra 
Peasants situated on the agricultural frontier never referred to the counter-
revolutionaries as 'Contras'. Instead, from Wiwili to Nueva Guinea, the peasants 
called them i a otra gente'; the 'other people'. 
The arrival of the revolution and the subsequent emergence of the Contra 
movement brought abrupt changes to peasant life. In setting up its line of defence, 
the Sandinistas disrupted the peasants' economy even further. After the first Con-
tra attacks, the administration made efforts to incorporate a broad band of 'collec-
tives', including the peasants, into the defence of the revolution. However, the way 
in which this mobilisation occurred had the effect of distancing the peasants still 
further from the Sandinista government and the revolutionary project. 
One of the great failures of the 'defence policy' was its systematic under-
valuing of the nature of peasant life, of its particular forms of production. Peas-
ant fighters, many of whom had initially volunteered for service, came to feel 
themselves to be at odds with the Sandinistas. The main elements in this 'dis-
tancing' process were the Sandinista's recruitment system, the work carried out 
in the rural areas by the Contras and the treatment meted out by both the 
Sandinista People's Army (EPS) and the Ministry of the Interior's Chief Execu-
tive Organisation for State Security(DGSE), the so-called 'seguridad'. 
The recruitment of peasants, 'para defender la revolution' (and this in areas char-
acterised by the non-implementation of the revolutionary project) was carried out 
without any prior preparation. Quite simply, Sandinista representatives present in the 
area were contacted and given the order to recruit men for immediate mobilisation. 
This was the case with battalion 50/83, recruited from the peasants of Matiguas, 
Muy-Muy and Pancasan. Sent to Puerto Cabezas in the Costa Atlantica region, it was 
famous for the counterproductive effect that it had on the Sandinista revolution:70 
The leaders said: 'We're going to mobilise you all, but only for two weeks'... 
They put us in a truck and sent us off. We didn't have any uniforms and most of 
us had no idea how to use a rifle ... They said that things were a little tough out on 
the coast and that we had to go and defend the revolution from imperialism ... 
well, you know, things like that. 
But they said that our families would be looked after, that they wouldn't need 
anything. And they told us that we could come and look after our allotments ... 
but none of that was true, it was all a big trap, a trick. And it was a great loss for 
all of us, a loss for us peasants.71 
As one of the leaders of battalion 50/83 pointed out, by not informing the men of 
their true destination or of the time that they were expected to fight, the peasants 
felt themselves to have been deceived. Their reaction was simple: desertion. 
The displacement of peasants to areas far from their homes constituted an attack 
on their collective sense of belonging and their system of production. The desertion 
of battalion 50/83 was merely a first step in a chain of reactions which saw many 
peasants put down their rifles, leave their battalions and walk out of their coopera-
tives, never again to take part in any institution or activity related to the revolution. 
Some went further still, setting aside part of their produce for the Contra. The height-
ened sense of dissatisfaction and distrust towards Sandinista political and military 
70 Ibid., pp. 132-7. 
71 Ibid., pp. 131 —4. 
structures was swiftly seized on by the Contras. Fear was another dimension, espe-
cially after the wave of desertions had taken place: 
When we got back home, there was no help at all for us... it was just the opposite: 
we started getting threats from the compas (the Sandinista soldiers). They said: 'I 
bet you're hanging around with the Contra, now that you've deserted the army ... 
well, you're going find out what happens to deserters' ... So we were scared of 
coming up against them, scared even to go down into town...72 
However, despite the reasons behind the desertions, there was no attempt by the 
Sandinistas to rectify recruitment policy until well into the second half of the 
decade. The mobilisations were kept up, later, the Self-Defence Cooperatives 
(CADs) were set up, and, from 1984, the highly unpopular obligatory military 
service — known as the Patriotic Military Service (SMP) — began to take its ef-
fect. Following a number of successful Contra attacks against certain supply and 
cooperative organisations, and increasingly aware that the EPS mobilisations 
were not obtaining the required results, the state began to try a different ap-
proach. The peasants were now 'oriented' towards the organisation of Self-
Defence Cooperatives, the official emphasis being on peasants defending the 
lands they had received. It was hoped that this would create a ring of protection 
around the agricultural frontier. The effect, however, was that the peasants began 
to think that the revolutionary administration as now, in effect, charging them for 
land originally distributed for free! 
The CADs failed economically, largely due to the constant mobilisations that 
their members were subjected to, creating yet further debt. From the peasants' point 
of view, this simply confirmed their already negative opinion of cooperatives. It 
seemed that while participation in these groups brought no clear advantages, it cer-
tainly brought disadvantages: 
If you said that you were waiting to harvest, they said that you were one of those 
people who didn't want to collaborate with the revolution. And then you were a 
marked man ... it was better just to go and keep out of trouble ... those compas 
could really screw you up ... 
It was like being in the EPS full-time ... but we had our obligation to the bank, 
and the bank wanted its money back ... The bank doesn't understand when you 
talk about mobilisation ...73 
The final blow came with military service. This fatally disrupted the peasants' eco-
nomic system, sending away its young men, generally for periods of two years, thus 
depriving peasants of the labour force required to sustain their economy. Further-
more, by sending the men far from their local areas, the link between the peasant and 
the comarca, so intensely felt and of such vital importance, was cut. Fear drove a 
great number to run away and hide in the forests. Together, these developments fi-
nally convinced the peasants that the revolution was against them, against their fami-
lies and their economy. Soon they began to react: 
People began to act much more 'together' in the comarcas ... permanent watch 
posts were set up to keep an eye on the SMP operatives ... we saw the compas out 
72 Ibidp. 136. 
73 Ibid., p. 167. 
and about on recruiting drives, but when they got to the villages, there were no 
men to be found ...74 
The implementation of the SMP was a disaster for the Sandinistas. After 18 
months it had achieved no substantial military advances in the zone. Worse still, 
the ratio of peasants who had gone over to the Contra compared to those who 
were recruited by the revolutionary forces was five to one in favour of la otra 
gente.15 And the upshot of all this, as a woman from Matiguas observed in 1996, 
was that there were simply no young men left in the comarcas: 
The towns and comarcas were sad places during the war ... there were no young 
men around, only women, children and old folk ... The young men were away 
with the army and la otra gente. And those who weren't had left the country ... 
Little by little, the EPS became the only aspect of the revolution that the peas-
ants were left with. Commerce had largely disappeared, loans from the BND 
were few and far between and there was no education or health service available. 
As a clerk from MIDINRA stationed in Region IV commented: 'the Contra got 
rid of us step by step'. 
A large number of cooperatives were dismantled after various incursions by the 
Contra. Other governmental institutions and guild organisations, as well as FSLN party 
members, also retreated to the towns. What remained was an armed presence, and only 
that. Naturally this reinforced the idea that the revolution was somehow the 'enemy' of 
the peasants' world. If it is true that military misconduct was initially directed only at 
individuals, it is also the case that, with the increasing success of the Contras, this mis-
conduct became more general. It was at this time that the Sandinista forces began to be 
called the 'pins' (from 'piricuaco', a synonym of 'hunting dog'). Such were the abuses 
committed that the leaders of the FSLN, the EPS and the DGSE were later forced to 
recognise with regret what had been carried out in their name:76 
The seguridad arrived at a peasant house late at night, and they took away the fa-
ther because someone had said that his son had gone over to the other side. 
The compas came and surrounded the church. They came inside during the mass itself 
and took away a man at gunpoint; they said he was a deserter . . .7 7 
As Horton documents, in the municipality of Quilalf it is not the Sandinista army 
but the state security apparatus that anti-Sandinistas remember with most fear 
and hostility.78 The overall mission of Sandinista state security was to gather in-
telligence on the Contras and counterevolutionary activities in general. In Quilali 
and other conflict zones, state security employed double agents who joined the 
Contra troops or collaborator networks, as well as a series of more casual infor-
mants who exchanged information for ideological reasons, money or liquor. 
Once the security forces had gathered sufficient information on a collaborator 
74 Taken from an interview with a former Contra member in Matiguas. 
75 According to reports carried out by CIERA specialists on behalf of the EPS and the MINT 
(CIERA, undated). 
76 See the document written in the FSLN Members' Assembly, El Crucero, at the beginning of 1990. 
This document discusses the reasons for the Sandinista electoral defeat and provides a rigorous list of 
errors committed, principally in the Peasant Country. It was later published in the magazine, Envio: 
FSLN (1990). 
77 Taken from various CIERA reports written in 1984 for the MINT. 
78 Horton (1998), pp. 211-14. 
network, authorities carried out arrests of up to a dozen peasant suspects. An 
Americas Watch investigation (1987) found that mass arrests were common 
practice in rural areas where Contras were active. 
The Sandinista forces frequently acted in ways that were violent and overbearing. 
News of their misconduct spread rapidly throughout the peasant communities. Many 
people lived quite literally in terror of the soldiers, fearing for their lives even in daily 
activities such as going to town. The war meant that the peasants' traditional neutrality 
was increasingly undermined. Soldiers would often use violence or threats to try to ex-
tract information about the Contra. People were indiscriminately accused of feeding 
and supplying the 'enemy'. Some peasants were even the victims of the EPS policy of 
confiscating goods and property from those alleged to have contacts with the Contra. 
By all accounts, the Sandinista forces were often successful in identifying and partially 
dismantling dozens of collaborator networks, but at a heavy political cost. 
At the height of the conflict the EPS began to use long range rockets — BM-
21s, more popularly referred to as 'Katiuskas' — against the counterrevolution-
ary forces. Many fell close to the peasants' houses, or into the middle of their 
corn fields. The communities were panic-stricken. When sociologists from the 
University of Central America (UCA) asked a peasant if these bombings were 
dangerous, he replied: 
Are they dangerous? Not for the Contra they're not ... they never even hit them, 
do they? But they're certainly dangerous for us ... the innocents are paying for 
the sinners ... 
Brutality, however, was certainly not the monopoly of the Sandinista forces. In 
the initial stages of the conflict, the Contra acted in the most violent ways on ar-
rival in the peasant communities. At this time its members were still largely for-
mer soldiers from Somoza's army, and their actions were wholly indiscriminate. 
Anyone could be accused of helping the Sandinistas.79 
'La otra gente', seeing that the peasants didn't share their views, began to torture 
and humiliate us. They raped our daughters and wives. They stole our cattle. And 
after that, they left their linkmen in place.80 So if someone took a cow and ate it, 
you couldn't complain to anyone, because a linkman would hear you. Next time 
the Contra were around, they might kill you. When their soldiers came here we all 
got out of the way, and they stole our pigs and other things . . . 8 1 
Stealing was the least of the problems that the peasants had to put up with. Many 
people, innocent of any particular 'association' with the Sandinistas, were tor-
tured and killed: 
There was a 15 year-old boy, mentally retarded and epileptic [in the cooperative in-
stallation that had just been attacked]. When we got back, we saw that he'd had his 
throat slit. They'd cut open his stomach and left his bowels spread out across the floor, 
79 A great number of testimonies to the Contra atrocities exist: for example, Pax Christi International 
(1981); Chomsky (1988); the confessions of an ex-Contra (Reimann, 1987); and the reports from the 
US NGO 'Witness for Peace'. 
80 Linkmen (enlaces) were peasants connected to the Contra who provided reports on EPS movements and 
informed on other peasants who were giving help or support to the Sandinistas. 
81 From Mendoza (1990) p. 27. 
like a rope. They did the same to Juan Corrales. He was shot in the fighting. They cut 
him open from top to bottom, took out his intestines and cut off his testicles.82 
The message of such brutality was clear: anyone assisting the Sandinistas in any 
way became a target for the Contra. Between 1982 and 1984 in Region IV alone, 
the Contra tortured and killed more than 400 peasants for having belonged to 
cooperative organisations. This message was quickly understood. 
The armed conflict between the Contras and the Sandinistas was prejudicial to 
peasant life as a whole, even if individuals were loyal to one or other side in the 
struggle. Peasants found themselves kidnapped by the Contra, taken prisoner by the 
Sandinistas, and their lands destroyed by both sides. The social organisation of their 
lives was systematically violated by forces external to the comarca. However, 
throughout the conflict the peasants gradually came to give their support to the Con-
tra, withdrawing it little by little from the Sandinistas. While both sides treated the 
peasantry badly, the majority came to feel that it was the government that had most 
clearly harmed their interests. This was reflected not only in the elections of 1984 
and 1990, in which the peasant vote went largely against the Frente Sandinista, but 
also in the progressive incorporation of peasants into the Contra. 
From 1983 onwards, the Contra took advantage of the errors of the revolutionary 
administration and its forces. Local leaders were incorporated in the same way that the 
FSLN had incorporated them before 1979. In this way the Contra was able to dismantle 
a number of cooperatives, to encourage boycotts of Sandinista proposals for the local 
area and — above all — to organise the massive recruitment of young peasants as 
fighters for the counterrevolution. In 1983, the Contra contingent directed by Field 
Commander 'Quiche', the CRJS (Comando Regional Jorge Salazar) was able to leave 
its base in Honduras and establish itself permanently in Zelaya Central, between Re-
gion VI and the San Juan river. New recruits soon surpassed all expectations, prompt-
ing the reorganisation of five distinct command groups. These were lead by men who 
were, largely, of peasant stock: Emiliano, Franklin, Capulina, Dumas and Fernando. 
Guerrilla activity in Regions V and VI changed its characteristics; fighters were no 
longer mercenaries and cx-guardias, they were now the soldiers of a peasant army 
which received its orders from its former 'patrons'. In this area, the Contra resistance 
was essentially headed by the finqueros leading thousands of colonos and other agri-
cultural workers who had been impoverished by MIDINRA's policies. Throughout the 
greater part of the 1980s, these men received their instructions from former colonels of 
the Guardia Nacional and agents from Washington. 
An analysis of the composition and structure of the CRJS's five command 
contingents and the Regional Command of Diriangen (CRD) reveals a striking 
similarity with structures present in the Peasant Country before 1979.83 The re-
sponsibilities and obligations of the contingents mirrored the pre-existing social 
stratification of those involved. As can be seen in Table 6, the ranks of political 
or military chief in the task forces (the combat divisions into which the Contra 
was divided) generally corresponded to finqueros or their sons. The troops were 
drawn from colonos and other workers of a similar social level, the mozos and 
82 Witness account of an attack on cooperative installations in 1984, Chomsky (1988) p. 22. 
83 CIERA (1985, pp. 172-4; 1986; 1989f, pp. 231-340); Nunez et al (1991), pp. 401-4. 
parceleros of the rural world. Collaboration networks were organised along the 
lines that had operated in the traditional estates.84 
Table 6: Composition of the Comando Regional Diriangen 
Poor peasant Trooper Runner or linkman 
'Middle' peasant 
(Between finquero and cam-
pesino pobre) 
Trooper, JFT, JD. Collaborator 
Livestock breeder 
or finquero 
Non-combatant Network head 
Rich peasant 
(father) 
Non-combatant Network head 
Rich peasant 
(son) 
JD, JCR Usually combat only 
Wife of insurgent Non-combatant Collaborator 
JFT: Jefe de Fuerza de Tarea (Task Force Head) 
JD: Jefe de Destacamento (Head of Detachment) 
JCR: Jefe de Comando Regional (Head of Regional Command) 
Source: Interviews with captured soldiers from Plan Llovizna, 1985, in CIERA (1989f) p. 268. 
The interests and aims of the different social groups were diverse. Thzf inqueros 
and their sons had joined up to recover their lands and possessions, the colonos 
and other workers because of the impossibility to work as they had done in the 
past and also in response to the treatment received at the hands of the Sandin-
istas. Finally, the collaborators were with the Contra because of the hopes they 
held out for a return to the past, to the ways of working and trading that they had 
known before. They also desired the disappearance of the regime that had taken 
their sons from them and had left them all impoverished: 
When we beat the Sandinistas, everything's going to change ... there'll be no 
more rationing ... the traders will all come back, we'll be able to buy clothes just 
like before ... no more repression, no more military service ... 
Additionally, joining up with the Contra represented the chance to stay in the 
same comarca. This was in stark contrast to the SMP. With the Contra, the peas-
ants could see their family from time to time, work in the fields at harvest time 
by day and join the task forces by night. This gave rise to the name — coined by 
84 The collaboration network was a civilian structure that protected, fed and provided information to 
the Contra's military units. It was established by recruiting a key member of the community who had 
sufficient economic resources to allow mobility and at the same time the capacity to remain free 
from suspicion. In general, the people used were farmers, traders, delegates of the word and even 
presidents of certain cooperatives. This person would then become the head of the network. The 
'runners' were civilian recruits who acted as subordinates and who were responsible for specific 
tasks such as carrying messages or acting as sporadic guides for the Contra. 
Social Level Military Rank Nature of Collaboration 
the Sandinistas — of 'part-time peasants'. Quite simply, for farmers faced with 
the SMP, the Contra was the lesser evil of the two options.85 
In the second half of the decade, when the FSLN had revised its policies in 
an attempt to recover its social base in the Peasant Country, many peasants, en-
rolled in the Contra, simultaneously took advantage of the assistance offered by 
the administration. Mendoza outlines this situation in an article questioning the 
Sandinista's intervention in this area:86 
They wouldn't have left, even though they would probably have remained the so-
cial base for the others (i.e. the Contras), working for them, they still wouldn't 
have left. But, given our policies, they thought: 'Well, I'll go, I'll leave the family 
and get out of the way. Meanwhile, they'll give my wife some kind of loan.' And 
that's what happened. And what was the result? That many, many men joined up 
with the Contra while we gave help to their wives and families ... 
Map 4: The Contra Line 
Between 1985 and 1986, several Contra command groups remained permanently in the 
Nicaraguan interior. Their leaders only returned to their Honduran bases in order to re-
fresh supplies, receive new orders and — in certain cases — to see their families. 
85 CIERA (1985), p. 132. 
86 Mendoza (1990), p. 41. 
There were seven main areas in Nicaragua in which the Contras were based: in Ba-
tistan Mountain; Zelaya Central; the Almendro and Cerro Musun; Region V; Co-
palar and the Rio Blanco; Region VI; and Waslala and the Bosawas Reserve on the 
east of the Atlantic coastal region. In this way, the Contra was able to count on a so-
cial base among the peasants that covered the entire agricultural frontier, and which 
allowed for ease of movement within a very broad range of territory. Stretching from 
the north, close to the Honduran border at San Jose de Bocay, passing through El 
Rosario and Wamblan, el Cua, Wiwili, el Rio Tuma, la Dalia, Rio Blanco, to the east 
of Matiguas, San Pedro del Norte, Bocana de Paiwas, to the east of Boaco, el Ayote, 
el Tortuguero, Wapi and Chontales, el Rama, Nueva Guinea right down to the San 
Juan River (running into Costa Rica). 
Given this situation, the EPS and MIDINRA displaced a great number of 
peasants in settlements,87 organised into cooperatives (usually self-defence 
groups), with the aim of creating a cordon of security around the Sandinista en-
claves. This cordon became, de facto, the Sandinistas' agricultural frontier, in 
which — according to the specific area — various projects were set up to com-
bat the Contra and to win over the enemy's support base.88 
The reply given by a captured Contra fighter to the question of whether the Con-
tras intended to kidnap men for combat clearly illustrates the way in which the Con-
tra had captured the Sandinistas' support base: 'Why should we kidnap anyone? 
Nowadays it's the people who come looking for us.'89 If the Contras were guilty in 
the first few years of coercing people to join up by force, threats, kidnapping and 
extortion, by the middle of the decade their methods had changed. From this point 
on, members were largely volunteers who joined up by means of a ritual process: the 
leader of the local command group would arrange a place and time with the would-
be fighter. He would then wait for the group to arrive, letting it go a full kilometre 
past him. The man would then run to catch up with the column. Once he had done 
so, the leader warned him that he was now with the Contra and that this meant leav-
ing father, mother and family hasta la victoria. 
By these means the Contra was able to become a combative force far in ex-
cess of the small army supplied by the USA and limited only to the north of the 
country that many have described. It was 'an army composed of peasants who 
were fighting against a regime that threatened their mercantile identity and their 
traditional axiology; a regime that had committed the error of undermining the 
authority of peasant leaders and of restricting freedom of movement; a regime 
which, through its military service, took away these people's sons, their most 
87 Settlements were concentrated in Regions II, V and VI, and in the Northern Atlantic Autonomous 
Region (RAAN). In Region I, there were 39 settlements distributed throughout various areas; in Re-
gion V 66, concentrated in the zones of Rama, Muelle de los Bueyes, Boaco, Juigalpa, Villa Sandino, 
Acoyapa, Santo Tomas, Camoapa and Nueva Guinea. Others were located around the Rio Blanco, 
Jinotega and Cua-Bocay. In the RAAN, there were 92 settlements distributed between the Prin-
zapolka River and the borderline River Coco. See the document by Barry and Serra (1989) and pub-
lished by CRIES, for an analysis of the refugees, repatriates and displaced population during the 
1980s. This information was later complemented by reports from the Comision Internacional de 
Apoyo y Verification de la Organization de Estados Americanos (CIAV), the institution responsible 
for overseeing the demobilisation of the Nicaraguan resistance. 
88 This was the Plan General Unico (FSLN, 1985), incorporating economic, social and defence 
characteristics, implemented with very unequal results in Regions I, V and VI. See also Horton 
(1998), pp. 2 2 9 ^ 0 . 
89 See also the text 'Contra Recruitment Tactics', in Horton (1998), pp. 180-3. 
precious asset and their main source of work'.90 It was this, later Contra that so 
successfully provided the men, the force and the sacrifice that characterised the 
subsequent conflict with the Sandinistas. 
Table 7: Population Totals Displaced, by Region (1981-88) 
Region Number of Number of peo- % of displaced people with respect 
families pie to total population 
I 14,000 84,000 23.6 
II 3,028 18,172 2.8 
III - - -
IV 183 1,100 0.7 
V 16,451 105,093 31.5 
VI 14,166 85,000 18.7 
RAAN* 7,216 43,300 26.8 
RAAS** 950 5,700 8.5 
RSJ*** 2,000 12,000 30.2 
Total 57,994 354,365 
(*) RAAN refers to the northern zone of the Atlantic Coast, known — from 1987 on-
wards — as the Northern Atlantic Autonomous Region. 
(**) RAAS refers to the southern zone of the Atlantic Coast, known — from 1987 on-
wards — as the Southern Atlantic Autonomous Region. 
(***) RSJ refers to Rio San Juan special region. 
Source: Regional government reports into the displaced population, Barry and Serra 
(1989), p. 42. 
What has come to be called the Peasant Contra, headed by field commanders from 
the peasantry, had the objectives of recovering lost territory, defeating the Sandinista 
regime and achieving the satisfaction of peasant's demands. Its contact with the other 
forces of the counterrevolutionary coalition (in which the US administration played a 
crucial role)91 was always carried out through intermediaries. And differences were 
experienced with these intermediaries not only in the ways in which the conflict was 
interpreted, but also in the way it was experienced, directed and — finally — ended. 
Although a range of interests had joined the Peasant Contra to the other forces of the 
Contra coalition, their objectives — as well as the price paid for obtaining them — 
were substantially different. However, the manipulation and use made of the peasant 
troops, and their subsequent betrayal by the Contra 'elite' and the USA, is beyond 
the scope of this essay. 
90 Nunez et al. (1991), p. 44. 
91 See Chomsky (1988); Gutman (1988); LaFeber (1993); Kornbluh (1987); Nunez et al. (1991); 
Walker (ed.) (1987), Yeves (1991). 
Towards a conclusion: the last peasant rebellion? 
In attempting to assess why peasants on the Nicaraguan agricultural frontier 
formed the social base of the Contras, this paper has focused on local, 'micro' 
events, in contrast to the macro-structural studies more usually undertaken. Part 
of the explanation lies in the construction of the 'new order' managed and over-
seen by the Sandinistas. The revolutionary project was built around a vanguard 
whose points of reference were the Cuban Revolution, Liberation Theology and 
dependency theory.92 In addition to a bias towards the urban proletariat, this led 
to the systematic undervaluing of the particular socioeconomic and cultural 
characteristics present in Nicaragua's interior93 and Atlantic regions.94 
The construction of an institutional 'environment' by means of official policies, 
of a symbolic world that excluded peasants, the growth of a state apparatus that 
penetrated the intimacy of the family group and the implementation of highly mod-
ernising agricultural policies served to separate the Peasant Country from the ad-
ministration. From the peasants' point of view, the creation of a 'new society' simply 
brought about the re-introduction of the old ways. While on the one hand the repres-
sive regime was dismantled, on the other the FSLN steadily increased their political 
impositions on a group which was almost never able to choose the policies applied to 
them. While it is certainly true that, for the first time in their history, the peasants 
were able to enjoy the benefits of education and health programmes and access to fi-
nancial credit, it is also true that the corresponding control over the group as a whole 
intensified. Evidently many peasants benefited from their organisation into coopera-
tives. Nevertheless, there remained a great number of peasants without land who 
were obliged to keep up the struggle for access to farming plots and to the agricul-
tural resources that increasingly came under state control. 
These developments, and the fact of finding their traditional neutrality un-
dermined by being trapped between two warring armies, resulted in the violation 
of the peasants' economic, social and cultural identity. In addition, the applica-
tion of modernising farm policies, with the expansion of the state's role in the 
agricultural sector, led to the dismantling of historically reciprocal connections, 
the network of intermediation that had always characterised relations between 
the land workers known as the finqueros, the colonos and the mozos. 
Such traditional intermediation was effectively destroyed by the Sandinista 
regime, which undermined the three institutions crucial to this system, namely, 
the patron, the market and the Catholic Church. Although these were powerful 
institutions, their links were essentially personal, rather than institutional. It was 
the trader, the finquero or the priest in person who dealt with the peasants. Cer-
tainly, these were relations of subordination, but they were generally not antago-
nistic, they rather were based on a network of loyalties. The factor that weighed 
uppermost in the mind of the peasant farmers was that of the 'identity of occu-
pation' in opposition to 'class identity'.95 
92 Marti (1997b), pp. 78-102. 
93 Bugazski (1990); Nunez et al. (1991); Rizo (2000). 
94 Hale (1994); Nietschmann (1989); Vilas (1991). 
95 E.P. Thompson (1979), p. 15. 
In addition to such 'objective' factors, the Peasant Revolution was the product of 
the peasants' perception of the new order. Protest was also directed against the 'new' 
forms of coercion that were imposed by the revolution. This feeling, based on a col-
lective notion of right and wrong, on what is acceptable and unacceptable from the 
productive point of view, is what E.P. Thompson (1979) defines as the 'moral econ-
omy of the poor', or what James Scott (1976) calls the 'moral economy of the peas-
ant'. It was this feeling of impotence and fury at seeing their world dismantled that 
was one of the principal detonators in the peasants' reaction to the Sandinista ad-
ministration. 'We'd simply had enough' was a common reply to the question of why 
the peasant revolution took place. This backs up Jeff Goodwin's (1994) observation 
that social scientists often miss one of the key interpretative elements of revolution-
ary phenomena by overlooking factors of anger, moral indignation, repulsion and 
fury against established power. 
In addition, the peasants also felt they were 'between a rock and a hard 
place', as David Stoll (1993) observed in his analysis of Ixil communities in 
Guatemala, and as Mark Danner (1994) notes in his assessment of the El Mozote 
massacre in El Salvador. This was one of the main factors in the peasants' deci-
sion to join up with the Contra. It is important to recognise that such a decision 
was frequently motivated by the need to save their own lives, and not by politi-
cal inclination.96 Pressurised by opposing forces, both of which were far from the 
values common to them, the peasants were obliged to 'define their position'.97 
Both the Contra and the Sandinistas acted violently towards the peasants, but the 
scales eventually tipped in favour of the Contras. 
Skocpol asserts that, precisely through the process of revolution, the state be-
comes ever more centralised, bureaucratic and powerful.98 To this observation we 
should also add that modernising processes such as the agricultural reforms de-
signed by the Sandinista administration generally have a negative impact on the 
peasants' world. Such was the case with the attempts at modernising Nicaraguan 
agriculture. Commercial exchange was considerably broadened (a new and con-
fusing factor for the farmer) under the control of the administration, subsistence 
crops were gradually replaced with others intended to satisfy the needs of external 
demand and generate hard cash and farmers were organised into productive groups 
that did not correspond to traditional methods of organisation and work. On the 
other hand, the revolution required the peasant collective to become, in effect, 
members of a political movement. Such a situation, and the establishment of a spe-
cific 'public order', violated principles of peasant neutrality. As in many other 
revolutions, small to medium-sized peasant producers in Nicaragua had great diffi-
culty finding a place within this new society and ended up in opposition to it. 
The peasants' response was not particularly 'counterrevolutionary', although 
it did imply an alternative to the revolutionary society being constructed. It 
should be understood, quite simply, as opposition to the undermining of the 'old 
order' present in the Peasant Country and, above all, as opposition to the trans-
formation of the rural world carried out by the revolution. For these peasants, the 
loss of the old order did not, in any way, represent 'progress'. What it did repre-
sent was the prolongation of subordination and inequality. Subsequent develop-
96 Scott (1985, 1990). 
97 Stoll (1993), p. 20. 
98 Skocpol (1979), p. 441. 
ments, leading to the post-1990 neoliberal society, produced the deepest feelings 
of frustration and betrayal." 
Paradoxically, such feelings also became characteristic of the urban sector of the 
population. The paradox here lies in the fact that, despite the clash between these two 
spheres, the urban and the rural, which characterised Nicaragua throughout the 
1980s, important sectors on both sides remained unsatisfied. One group was de-
fending its only opportunity to bring about a fairer society, a society which was its 
'own'; the other was reacting against the destruction of the world on which their very 
subsistence, individually and collectively, depended. It remains to be seen if these 
collectives can successfully reincorporate themselves into a harmonious society. This 
certainly demands that the process of reconciliation originate from below, and not be 
imposed 'from above'. 
99 See, for example, the testimonies of CIAV-OEA (1999) report. 
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